Beyond the Western financial crisis
‘The credit crunch is creating a new world order in banking and finance . . . It’s a world in which the Chinese state, if it co-ordinated the investments of its cash-rich institutions, could end up owning more-or-less the entire financial system of the US and the UK.’ That was the view of BBC business editor Robert Peston.44 Although the financial crisis seemed global, the origins began in the highly leveraged West, and posed a greater long-term threat to the economic systems of post-industrial economies than to rapidly industrialising ones. Looking forward on how this period of history—what we now refer to as ‘the credit crunch’—will be appraised, the term ‘Western Financial Crisis’ might be a strong candidate. If a New Financial Order is emerging, it is clear that China will play a significant role in how it is formed.
Mark Leonard of the European Council for Foreign Relations said, ‘it’s not just economic and military power that’s shifting from west to east. China is emerging as an intellectual power. It’s coming up with its own ideas, which are very influential, which other people are copying.’ He explained that ‘the debate we’re having about managing China’s rise has got a mirror image in China, where they’re having an argument about how to manage the west’s decline. In the US, they’re talking about what mix to have of containment and engagement, to try to get the China that they want. But what’s interesting is that the Chinese are thinking about how they can shape an America that is organised in a way that benefits their interests.’45
Some worry about the growing role of China on the world stage; others welcome it. As expected, the focus of the world’s attention on the Summer Olympic Games in Beijing led to widespread coverage of China’s poor human rights record and its occupation of Tibet, and PetroChina’s oil investments in Sudan, which human rights campaigners have long argued is complicit with genocide occurring in the Darfur region.46
With calls for Olympic boycotts made by some campaigners falling on deaf ears, the London Times (which is owned by News International, a company with significant investments in China) collected together a series of articles on its website examining some weaknesses in anti-China arguments. One Times commentator noted that ‘The lowlife double standards that informed Western views of the vicious Easterner 60 years ago are being rehabilitated in the modern era by human rights activists, who are calling on Western democracies to put pressure on China over its occupation of Tibet and its human rights abuses.’ The logic of this argument about racially motivated fears was somewhat confused when the author added ‘the West has no moral authority to lecture anyone, including China, about rights and democracy. Here in Britain, free speech has been curbed through the creation of new thought crimes (see the Racial and Religious Hatred Act).’47
A more compelling pro-China argument rests on indications that some African nations are increasingly welcoming and voluntarily preferring Chinese state-led investment projects over Western private investment. South African-based commentator Janine Erasmus reported in September 2008 that ‘China has become Africa’s third-largest trade partner, after the US and former colonial power France. According to a report by China’s General Administration of Customs, bilateral trade between China and Africa will exceed R803 billion ($100 billion) in 2008, two years earlier than predicted.48
‘The trend is attributed to escalating shipments of natural resources to China, especially crude oil, mainly from Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo and Angola, metals from Ghana, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and South Africa, as well as cobalt and other minerals. At the same time, goods manufactured in China are increasingly sought after by African consumers. During the first half of 2008, exports to China from Africa rose 92 percent to R240 billion ($30 billion), while the continent imported goods to the value of R184 billion ($23 billion), an increase of 40 percent according to the Chinese customs authority.’
One key advantage for China in what is often viewed as a ‘new scramble for Africa’ has been the ability of its state-controlled banks to finance infrastructure investment as part of its trading arrangements. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, China ‘is estimated to have pumped in $9 million for developing the mines and building roads and hospitals. In exchange it will be allowed to mine in the mineral rich Congo for 22 years. Despite heavy criticism from opposition parties the government has continued to defend the deal. It has described it as the “Marshall plan” it needed, to rebuild the country and ensure it reaches double digit growth levels.’49
When the mines reach full production capacity, China will be extracting 4,000 tons of copper from six mines. Deputy Minister of Mines Victor Kasongo told South African television that ‘It was important for Congo to have infrastructure to sustain. It is not by Congo’s fault [that] others couldn’t give us the money or access the market. So we had to take our own responsibility to bring growth forward. The China deal came to replace the promise we had with western countries.’50
According to the contract, China is expected to build close to 4,000 km of road connecting the country’s major economic hubs, 26 hospitals and improve 250 km of road in Kinshasa alone. Opposition members have criticised the deal, arguing that it favours Chinese firms who receive much of the building work. With China, Brazil and India tying up infrastructure or loan deals in several African countries, often in return for oil, metals and other commodity resources, concerns have been raised among traditional lenders such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.
In response to these concerns African members of the IMF meeting in August 2008 in Mauritania issued a declaration pledging ‘greater transparency in their dealings with China and other so-called non-traditional sources of finance’.51 IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn told Reuters in August 2008 that ‘It is good news that there are new sources of financing, but we have to be very careful in order that this new financial help does not destroy the original policies of the Bretton Woods institutions’.52 A report released in July 2008 by the World Bank53 states that China, together with India and several Gulf nations, is financing a number of large infrastructure projects, such as hydropower schemes and transport schemes, across sub-Saharan Africa which may have positive impacts in the drive to reduce poverty. World Bank vice president for Africa Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili has remarked, ‘China’s growing infrastructure commitments in Africa are helping to address the huge infrastructure deficit of the continent.’54
In an era of globalisation, it is natural that Western firms will face increasing competition around the world. What was perhaps unforeseen by Western policy-makers was the scale of the impact of state support for Chinese investment. Rosalind McLymont writing in the New Jersey-based Shipping Digest55 reports that ‘China’s two-way trade with Africa surged past $70 billion in 2007, compared with less than $1 billion in 1980, while US trade with Africa grew to about $85 billion from about $23 billion in the same period . . . Between 1998 and 2006, Africa’s exports to China increased 2,126 percent against 402 percent in exports to the United States. To facilitate those exports, Beijing set up most-preferential-treatment agreements with 20 African countries, including tariff-free treatment on 454 products imported from the least developed nations.’ She also noted that ‘With $1.7 trillion in cash reserves, compared to the United States’ $62 billion, Beijing has much more leverage for deals in Africa than Washington does.’
The scale of growing South–South cooperation and investment led by China represents a new challenge to traditional Western-led North–South investment. While some Western companies have responded to the corporate responsibility agenda by building infrastructure and increasing the transparency of their dealings with developing-country governments (for instance, BP in Angola), the willingness of private international capital to take long-term risks is more constrained than recent state-facilitated Chinese arrangements in Africa. One consequence is that, while Western hydrocarbon companies may have led the oil boom in African nations, as the centre of global economic power shifts ‘eastwards and southwards’ contracts for infrastructure and future development are increasingly going to Southern-based companies, with China, Brazil and India posing a growing challenge to Western dominance in world trade. Along with that will be a reduction in Western influence on the corporate responsibility agenda, as new challenges, views and initiatives emerge among a more diverse field of business activity.
(The references are available in the pdf download and hard copy versions of this annual review, available from Lifeworth’s bookstore.)
This section can be referenced as:
Bendell, J., and N. Alam, S. Lin, C. Ng, L. Rimando, C. Veuthey, B. Wettstein (2009) The Eastern Turn in Responsible Enterprise: A Yearly Review of Corporate Responsibility from Lifeworth, Lifeworth: Manila, Philippines. (Page numbers for this section are available in the pdf download and hardcopy.)